

DE LA RECHERCHE À L'INDUSTRIE



Binsec: a platform for binary code analysis

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Binary code analysis : Why ?

Source program

Ada
C/C++
Java
Perl
Python
...

Compiler

Binary program

00101101010110011011
10001010110101001010
01011010101011001101
00101101010110000101
10001010110101001101
.....

Source analysis (✓, •, ✗)

Binary analysis (✓, •, ✗)

- Analysis without access to source code
 - Proprietary software
 - Analysis of malware
- Alternative to source code analysis
 - Compiler independent !
 - Multi-languages programs

Introduction

Binary code analysis : Why ?

Source program

Ada
C/C++
Java
Perl
Python
...

Compiler

Binary program

```
00101101010110011011  
10001010110101001010  
01011010101011001101  
00101101010110000101  
10001010110101001101  
.....
```

Source analysis (✓, ●, ✗)

Data Types If...then...else
While, for, until Var names
Jump targets Functions



Binary analysis (✓, ●, ✗)

- Analysis without access to source code
 - Proprietary software
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Challenges of binary code analysis (1)

Entry point

```

push ebp
mov ebp,esp
mov ds:0x80ebf48,0x1
mov eax,ds:0x80ebf48
cmp eax,0x9
ja 80490f6
mov eax, [eax*4+0x80be148]
jmp eax
?
```

Code or Data ?

```

00b8 5400 0000 5dc3 5589 e5c7 0540 bf0e
0812 0000 00b8 4800 0000 5dc3 5589 e5c7
0540 bf0e 0820 0000 00b8 4500 0000 5dc3
5589 e5c7 0540 bf0e 0821 0000 00b8 5800
0000 5dc3 5589 e5c7 0540 bf0e 0822 0000
00b8 4900 0000 5dc3 5589 e583 ec10 c705
48bf 0e08 0100 0000 a148 bf0e 0883 f809
0f87 0002 0000 8b04 8548 e10b 08ff efc6
45f7 00c6 45f8 00c6 45f9 00c6 45fa 00c7
0548 bf0e 0802 0000 00e9 d901 0000 c645
f701 c645 f800 c645 f900 c645 f900
f800 750a c705 48bf 0e08 0000 0000 0000
7d fc00 7413 007d 0000 0000 0000 0000
d fc00 7413 007d 0000 0000 0000 0000
3 0600 0000 e988 0100 00e9 0000 0000 0000
5 f701 c645 f800 c645 f900 0000 0000 0000
d fc00 740f c705 48bf 0e08 0000 0000 0000
e 0100 00e9 5901 0000 c645 0000 0000 0000
0 c645 f900 c645 fa03 807d 0000 0000 0000
d fe00 750a c705 48bf 0e08 0000 0000 0000
d fc00 750a c705 48bf 0e08 0000 0000 0000
d fe00 740f c705 48bf 0e08 0000 0000 0000
e 0100 00e9 0901 0000 c645 0000 0000 0000
0000 00e9 df00 0000 c645 f701 c645 f800
fd00 750f c705 48bf 0e08 0400 0000 e9e4
0000 00e9 df00 0000 c645 f701 c645 f800

```

Challenges of binary code analysis (2)

■ Low-level semantics of data

- Machine arithmetic, bit-level operations
 - Systematic usage of untyped memory [big array]
- Difficult for current formal techniques**

Nice progress since 2004

■ Low-level semantics of control

- No clear distinction data/instructions
 - Dynamic jumps (jump eax)
- No easy syntactic recovery of CFG**

Intermediate languages

- REIL [Zynamics]
- BIL [CMU]
- DBA [CEA, LaBRI]
- RREIL [TUM] ...

CFG recovery

- CodeSurfer/x86 [GrammaTech]
- Jakstab [TU München]
- CFGBuilder [CEA]
- ...

■ Diversity of architectures and instruction sets

- Too many instructions (ex. X86, ≥ 900 instructions)
 - Modeling issues : side effect, addressing mode, ...
- No platform independent concise formalism**

Tests generation

- SAGE [Microsoft]
- OSMOSE [CEA]
- Mayhem [ForAllSecure]
- ...

Binary analysis in Binsec Platform

BinSec : binary analysis platform with four main services :

- Front-end [loader, decoder, disassembly, simplifications]
- Simulator [concrete interpretation]
- Generic static analyzer [fixpoint loop, CFG recovery]
- DSE [flexible : C/S (concretisation/symbolisation), path search]

Novelties :

- DBA Intermediate Representation
- Simplification engine of DBA
- Static binary analysis with (source-level) features
- Flexible DSE

9 Instructions

Advantages

- Platform-independent
- Concise set of instructions
- Specification and abstraction mechanisms

```
lhs := e;  
goto e; <call, return>  
goto bv; <call, return>  
ite (e)? goto bv : goto bv  
stop;  
lhs := nondet();  
lhs := undef;  
assert (cond);  
assume (cond);
```

28 Expressions

```
v <flag, temp>, (r, bv)  
@e[ $\xleftarrow{k}$ ] @e[ $\xrightarrow{k}$ ]  
e {i..j}, extu,s(e, n)  
e {+, -, ×, /u,s, %u,s} e  
e {∧, ∨, ⊕, >>, <<u,s, :: } e  
e {<u,s, ≤u,s, =, ≠, ≥u,s, >u,s} e
```

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
DBA simplification

Static analysis

Symbolic execution


Conclusion

BINSEC Platform Overview




BINSEC Platform Overview

- Front-end [loader, decoder, disassembly, simplifications]
- Simulator [concrete interpretation]
- Generic static analyzer [fixpoint loop, CFG recovery]
- DSE [flexible : C/S (concretisation/symbolisation), path search]




- Developed in OCaml [$\approx 30\ 000$ loc] [TACAS 2015]
- Within the BINSEC project [CEA, IRISA, LORIA, Univ-Grenoble]

BINSEC Platform Overview




BINSEC Platform Overview



BINSEC Platform Overview

Static analysis


- Generic fixpoint computation
- Sound CFG recovery



DBA

Symbolic execution

- Generic concretization & symbolization
 - Path predicate optimization
 - Generic path search
- cf. R. David, J. Feist and D. Ta



DBA
Stub

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
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X86 front-end



81 c3 57 1d 00 00 X86 reference \Rightarrow ADD EBX 1d57

```

1 (0x29e,0) t := EBX + (cst, 7511 < 32 >);
(0x29e,1) OF := (EBX{31,31}=(cst, 7511 < 32 >){31,31}) && (EBX{31,31}<>t{31,31});
(0x29e,2) SF := t{31,31};
(0x29e,3) ZF := t = (cst, 0<32>);
(0x28e,4) AF := ((extu (EBX{0,7}) 9) + (cst, 7511 < 32 >){0,7}){8,8};
(0x29e,5) PF := t{0,0}⊗t{1,1}⊗t{2,2}⊗t{3,3}⊗t{4,4}⊗t{5,5}⊗t{6,6}⊗t{7,7}⊗1<1>;
(0x29e,6) CF := ((extu EBX 33) + (extu (cst, 7511 < 32 >) 33)){32,32};
(0x29e,7) EBX := t; goto (0x2a4,0)
  
```

DBA simplifications

- Instruction level simplifications
 - Idiom simplifications[local rewriting rules]
- Block level simplifications
 - Constants propagation
 - Remove redundant assigns
- Program level simplifications
 - Flag slicing (remove must-killed variables)
 - granularity : function level+automatic summary of callees

Approach

- Inspired from standard compiler optim
- Targets : flags & temp
- Sound : w.r.t. incomplete CFG
- Inter-procedural (summaries)

DBA simplifications : Experiments

program	native loc	DBA loc	opt (DBA)		
			time	loc	red
bash	166K	559K	673.61s	389K	30.45%
cat	8K	23K	18.54s	18K	23.02%
echo	4K	10K	6.96s	8K	24.26%
less	23K	80K	69.99s	55K	30.96%
ls	19K	63K	65.69s	44K	30.58%
mkdir	8K	24K	19.74s	17K	29.50%
netstat	17K	50K	52.59s	40K	20.05%
ps	12K	36K	36.99s	27K	23.98%
pwd	4K	11K	7.69s	9K	23.56%
rm	10K	30K	24.93s	22K	25.24%
sed	10K	32K	28.85s	23K	26.20%
tar	64K	213K	242.96s	154K	27.48%
touch	8K	26K	24.28s	18K	27.88%
uname	3K	10K	6.99s	8K	23.62%

	reduction			
	time	dba instr	tmp assigns	flag assigns
BINSEC	1279.81s	28.64%	90.00%	67.04%
GDSL-Like	1077.98s	15.65%	86.21%	30.27%

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■ Basic domains :


- Dual intervals : $([0, 1]_u; [0, 1]_s) - 1 = ([0, 255]_u; [-1, 0]_s)$
- Flags : $ZF \mapsto (eax - ebx == 0)$
- Equality : $\{eax == ebx\} \mapsto ([0, 3]_u; [0, 3]_s)$

■ Lifting to byte-precise memory model [Frama-C]

■ Tradeoff precision vs scale



- $K - callstring$ context sensitivity
- Loop unrolling
- Variants of widening (thresholds/delayed)

Widening points positioning




- Automatic widening point detection with DFS
- Smart positioning of widening points

Widening points positioning



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Widening points positioning




- Automatic widening point detection with DFS
- Smart positioning of widening points

CFG recovery

```
5: ...
6: x := @[4 * y + 100]; (y, @[100], @[104], @[108]) ↦ ([0, 2], [35, 35], [45, 45], [82, 82])
7: goto x;           x ↦ [35, 82] // x ↦ {35, 45, 82}
```

- Need of precise target values at **djmp, store, load**
- Use $\text{pre}^{\leq k}$ to check actual targets w.r.t. AI invariant [Bardin-ICST15, Brauer-EMSOFT11-ESOP11]
- If $\text{pre}^{\leq k}$ fails then switch to degraded mode (pre. iter. AI : ⑦ → {⑯, ⑰}) [Kinder-VMCAI12]
- Refine AI invariant for **load/store** ([a, b]) w.r.t $\text{pre}^{\leq k}$



High-level predicate recovery

- Store relations in flag variables
- Propagate relations (take updates into account)

```
cmp x y; //OF := (({x,31,31} ≠ {y,31,31}) & ({x,31,31} ≠ {(x-y),31,31}));  
//SF := (x-y) < 0;  
//ZF := (x-y) = 0;  
jg a; //if ( $\neg ZF \wedge (OF = SF)$ ) then goto a
```

- Too complex for basic non-relational domains
- Complex low-level predicate may hide simple predicate

```
if (x > y) then goto a
```

- **Template-based** recovery (Platform independent) [sub. FM16]

Experiments

progs	#loc	#conds	#succ		#fail	time (s)	time _{all} (s)
firefox	21488	150 (137)	134	89% (98%)	16	1.40	55.91
cat	6490	132 (125)	116	88% (92%)	16	1.08	259.24
chmod	8954	183 (172)	159	87% (92%)	24	1.44	313.17
cp	67199	174 (162)	152	87% (94%)	22	4.79	346.84
cut	7358	148 (138)	132	89% (96%)	16	1.16	211.73
dir	9732	137 (126)	118	86% (94%)	19	1.26	201.67
echo	8016	190 (182)	168	88% (92%)	22	1.43	274.60
kill	6911	142 (133)	125	88% (94%)	17	1.17	209.79
ln	88837	203 (185)	177	87% (96%)	26	4.88	531.58
mkdir	6347	125 (117)	109	87% (93%)	16	1.01	235.80
Verisec	11552	394 (370)	370	87% (100%)	24	3.31	34.48
total	242884	1978 (1847)	1760	89% (95%)	218	22.93	2674.81

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
Symbolic execution

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DSE : In brief

Definition

Symbolic execution is the mean of executing a program using symbolic values (logical symbols) rather than actual values (bitvectors) in order to obtain in-out relationship of a path.



Dynamic Symbolic Execution [DSE] :

- precise reasoning on a single path
- sound execution of the program (*path necessarily feasible*)
- can recover new paths (goto eax, call/ret, etc.)
- thwart basic tricks (*code overlapping..*)

Originality :

- C/S meta language to modulate concretization/symbolization
- stub engine
- path predicate optimizations
 - Constant propagation
 - Variable rebasing
 - Read-Over-Write
- generic path coverage
 - DFS, BFS, random path

Solvers supported : Z3, boolector, CVC4

Results obtained

- Scale on large traces (with C/S policies) [R. David-ISSTA16]
 - benchmark on all coreutils (100 binaries)
- Provided good results for deobfuscation [sub. R. David-CCS16]
 - opaque predicates : no false negative, very low false positive
 - call stack tampering : no false positive, identify different kind of tampering
- Good results for Use-After-Free detection [sub. J. Feist-WOOT16]
 - Vulnerability found in JasPer (CVE-2015-5221)

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Front-end

- $\approx 460 / \approx 500$ targeted x86 instructions supported
- DBA simplifications
- Tested on Coreutils, Windows Malwares, Verisec/Juliet, etc.

Static analysis module

- Standard (basic domains, precision trade off) :
Context sensitive AI, Widenings, Loop unrolling, dual intervals
- New : Natural flag recovery, automatic detection of widening points, CFG recovery with $AI + pre^{\leq k}$

Dynamic symbolic execution

- Scalable/tunable approach for path coverage

Questions ?